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BOOKS REVIEWED
A Living Bill of Rights. William 0. Douglas. New York: Doubleday and Co.
1961. Pp. 72. $1.50.
The dean of popular publications on the United States Supreme Court bench has
done it again. He now has written a handy thin volume entitled A Liking Bill of
Rights which is designed to interpret the fundamental freedoms and the basic
protections against domestic tyranny enshrined in the federal constitution.
The practicing lawyer will find in this book a comprehensive view of recent
Supreme Court doctrine. It provides perspective over a profoundly important area
of the body politic which holds a key to the singular nature and destiny of our
American way of life.
Tested in the time of a critical rivalry between communist tyranny and the
free world, in which the United States is the bastion of strength, our liberties retain
uncommon vigor-the vigor of doctrine on which there is general consensus among
our countrymen-while yielding to the necessities of internal security and relations
abroad. The outline of their shape in mid-century is described here by Mr. Justice
Douglas.
The scope of the Bill of Rights, for the purpose of this exposition, comprehends
not only certain provisions of the original text of the Constitution relating to civil
liberties and the first ten amendments, which are a restraint on the federal power,
but also the judicial interpretations that have grafted certain of the first ten amendments onto the states via the fourteenth amendment.
The significance of the prefatory word "Living" in the title, as explained by the
author, is that these guarantees are truly secure only when part of the fabric of
our daily life, enforced by the people in their mutual daily contact. We cannot
afford dissension of a destructive character which would weaken our nation in the
face of the challenge abroad; but on the other hand we are capable as a nation, and
our courts are capable, of making mature judgments on the limits of a free speech
and press which will enable wide latitude for stimulating, legitimate, controversial,
and fresh thinking, political and otherwise.
Not that free speech is without its limits, as Mr. Justice Holmes' celebrated
formulation of the standard of "clear and present danger"1 attests. The focus of
the early '60's, however, no longer seems to be on subversion as the prime battleground of civil rights issues. It seems to be on the struggle for equality of
opportunity for all people which has been making steady progress since World
War II, and is now being projected onto new scenes with tremendous impetus. The
"sit-ins" of 1960, like a bolt, inaugurated one trend, creating the major challenge
to Southern mores since the Civil War. At another part of this spectrum is the
pressure to secure full and equal accommodations for the diplomats of the new
African nations.
The decisions2 by the United States Supreme Court, declaring unconstitutional
any form of state supported racial segregation in schooling, inaugurated another
significant wave toward equality.
Far from least among the civil rights issues of our time, is the line between the
requirements of the police in combating crime and the rights of the person who is
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 4S3 (1954); Boiling v. Sharp2, 347 V.S. 497
(1954).
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arrested. Due process and other constitutional guarantees derived from the great
English system of common law protect our citizenry from tyranny at the hands
of the criminal authorities. 3 So, too, there are civil rights problems implicit in
legislation which would subject to the same penalty as obscene literature any of
the "hate" literature which defames racial, religious or ethnic groups, thereby inciting the commission of crime. For this reason the bill 4 penalizing "hate" literature
which was recently recommended to the New York legislature was recommended
for study only so that community leaders might first have the opportunity to comment on the civil liberties problems which the proposed legislation raises.
In such fields as these our first amendment decisions have been formulated. In
more recent years we have been posed in a deadly serious conflict with the communist world. These are trying times for our civil rights, an inextricable part of
the way of life which we are fighting to preserve.
Mr. Justice Douglas has performed a significant service in contributing through
his book to public understanding of our precious heritage of individual freedom and

dignity.
Louis J. LEFKOWITZ*

The Tax Practice Deskbook. Harrop A. Freeman and Norman D. Freeman.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Pp. xx, 581. $17.50.
This book, according to its preface, is directed at five groups: lawyers, accountants
and businessmen who handle tax cases; tax specialists; and students of taxation.
It deals wholly with tax procedure and practice, not with the substantive law of
taxation; and only with federal procedure, not with state. So far as federal practice
is concerned, the book ranges from the conduct of a case in the Internal Revenue
Service to practice in the appellate courts. Particular chapters are devoted to "How
to Brief a Tax Case," "The Justice Department and Tax Cases" and to "Common
Procedural Problems." The volume is replete with citations of statutes, decisions,
regulations, and bibliographies of books and law review articles. The authors
obviously spent much time preparing their material and enjoyed excellent assistance.
Many of us, after a lifetime of tax practice, have contemplated writing such a
book. The desire to pass on one's experience to associates, students, or even to
purchasers of one's book, is universal and perhaps even insatiable. The troublesome
questions are: can it be done at all, and how can it be done? In particular, can
the distilled essence of years of practical experience be conveyed to someone through
chapters in a book? Certainly applicable regulations, statutes, and decisions can be
assembled and organized, so that they will be more readily available than they
would be in a tax service. But even so. would a practitioner dare, after the year
the book is issued, to rely on it to the exclusion of the inevitably more up-to-date
tax service?
Can any book be a substitute for the education a tax lawyer gives his young
associate by taking him to a conference, or by working with him on the preparation
of a protest, a memorandum, or a brief? Chapter three of this book is entitled
"Facts! Facts! Facts!" and the emphasis is well placed. Appreciation of the im3. On this problem I have prepared and published a booklet outlining the rights of a
person arrested. See Lefkowitz, Your Rights if Arrested (undated booklet published In
cooperation with the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n).
4. N.Y. Assembly No. 1977 (1961); N.Y. Senate No. 1380 (1961).
* Attorney General, State of New York.
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portance of thorough preparation of the facts comes from actual work with v.itnesses and documents in getting a case ready for trial. No amount of citations
of decisions, or statutes, and no amount of text, can have quite the same educational effect.
The customary process for legal education and the transmission of legal experience
has come to be a combination of law school study, followed by practice in an office
under the direction of men who work every day in the various fields. When he
hires a recent law school graduate to work in the field of taxation, a lawyer is apt to be
more interested in the young man's sound general training and his ability to analyze
legal problems than in the seminars he has attended on pension trusts or on Internal
Revenue practice. The employing lawyer probably believes that the young graduate
will receive the best training in such subjects while he worhs in the office.
The Tax Practice Deskbook is a useful assemblage of technical materials. It is
well designed for the "students of taxation" for whom it was written. It will not
be so useful to tax specialists, who can find most of the material elsewhere. The
Deskbook does not present quite enough of the authors' own experiences; and the
comments sometimes border on the naive. Some of us have occasionally found
Internal Revenue agents who did not know "all the law and rulings" even "in a
[their] specialized field. . . ." (p. 148.) Closing agreements are not quite as easy
to get as the authors indicate. (p. 165.) The discussion of Tax Court stipulations
does not sufficiently bring out the facts that negotiations for stipulations are common, are the accepted avenue for seeking settlements in Tax Court cases, and that
the bulk of such cases are settled and not tried. The utility of the Deslbool. would
have been greater had it included an appendix of forms and at least a selection of
applicable rules of court.
The Deskbook is nicely printed with a minimum of proof errors. It is a useful
collection of technical material for a student, and a lawyer handling his first tax
case could read relevant chapters to advantage. It does not transmit much of the wisdom of practical experience. So far as I am aware, this has to be acquired the hard
way.
ROSWE.L MAGILL*

A Century of Civil Rights. Milton R. Konvitz. New York: Columbia University
Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 293. $6.00.
Some very creditable books are unsuccessful because the author's reach exceeds
his grasp, and he is unable to execute the design envisioned. Others misfire because,
despite a wealth of interesting detail, the basic conception is too sketchy or lopsided.
The latter is the shortcoming that afflicts the present w:ork. Although the early
chapters contain much fascinating historical information, the sequences are too brief
and broken to classify this book as a history. The later chapters offer a tour d'horion
of state legislation in the field of civil rights, but they are not sufficient to serve
adequately as a reference work. The authors write as avowed protagonists of civil
rights enforcement, but their argumentation is presented here and there in so patchy
a way that the book can hardly be described as an analytic or discursive study.
Though thus nondescript, the work is far from valueless. In an excellent opening
chapter entitled "Freedmen or Free Men," Milton R. Konvitz, Professor of Law and
Member of the Firm of Cravath, Swaine and Moore; Member of the .odation
the Bar of the City of New York.

of
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Industrial Labor Relations at Cornell University, traces the social and psychological
background of the post-Civil War civil rights legislation. By most illuminating comparisons with other slave-owning societies, he lays the basis for understanding why
the emancipation of the Southern slave accomplished little or nothing for him as a
Negro. In both Roman and Greek civilizations, slavery was basic to the economy
and to the existence of a cultured leisure class. But slavery was a status which could
be dissolved by purchase of freedom or by manumission, and no stigma attached to
the freedman-he was a free man. Centuries later in South America these same traditions were preserved by the Roman Catholic Church, and the result was a legal
system in which the Negro slave enjoyed far more protection than he did in the
Southern United States.
If, to paraphrase Gertrude Stein, a slave is a slave because he is a slave, then he
has only to end his enslavement in order to be a free man. But if a slave is a slave
because he is a Negro, then emancipation makes him a freedman but does not free
him from the disabilities of his race. When the Rebellion was broken, the
defeated states at once sought to ensure that emancipation should yield the Negro
not freedom but racial thralldom. The legislative instruments of oppression were
the "black codes" adopted in the Southern States which deprived Negroes of equality
before the law, barred them from occupations other than service or agricultural labor,
and perpetuated the essence of slavery through laws nominally dealing with apprenticeship, contract labor, and vagrancy.
Thus, throughout the Southern and Border States, the slavery question became the
race question. The parallels to South Africa are striking and it is easy to imagine
that even if the institution of slavery had never existed in Africa-or indeed, anywhere else-the lot of the South African Negro might not be very different from
the present actuality.
It is not sufficiently realized that the harshness of "Reconstruction" was in large
part a response to the harshness of the "black codes." Mr. Konvitz brings this out
in his three chapters on the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution and the
federal civil rights enactments during the post-war decade, 1866-1875. Important parts
of the Civil Rights Act of 18751 were declared unconstitutional in 1883 by the Supreme Court, 2 and Mr. Konvitz' analysis of the legislative history of this law, and the
effect of the Supreme Court's decision, is perhaps the best part of the book.
The Civil Rights Act, as introduced by Senator Charles Sumner, contained provisions requiring racially integrated schooling. With the tacit consent of some of the
Negro members of Congress these provisions were dropped, and the bill as enacted
related chiefly to racial equality of treatment in common carriers, hotels, and other
"public" places. But most of this was nullified by the decision in the Civil Rights
Cases,3 which limited Congress' power to the prohibition of discriminatory action by
the state governments. It is a strange irony that the requirement of integrated schooling, which Congress then rejected, was reborn some eighty years later by the Supreme
Court's decision in the Brown4 case, while the things that Congress sought to advance
in 1875 were nullified by the Court eight years later.
"Reconstruction, and the cause of Negro equality, was abandoned in the compromise of 1877. . . ." (p. 69). That is all Mr. Konvitz chooses to tell us. In his account,
the "Century of Civil Rights" has a beginning and an end, but no middle. What were
1.

18 Stat. 335 (1875).

2. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the causes of the "compromise"? What happened from 1S33 to 1953? What did
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Robert LaFollette, and Herbert Hoover think
or do about the racial issue? The curious reader must lool: elsewhere, for none of
these men are even mentioned.
Scanning the intervening decades, Mr. Konvitz presents a brief analysis of the Civil
Rights Acts of 19 575 and 1960,0 and sketches various developments since the Brown
case, including the student "sit-ins" and decisions on restrictive covenants. Mr. Theodore Leskes, Director of the Legal Division of the American Jewish Committee,
contributes four chapters on state anti-discrimination laws, covering public accommodations, employment, education, and housing. Mr. Konvitz concludes the book with
a short chapter supporting the use of state power to enforce racial equality and
deploring the concept of "voluntarism."
Prohibition was repealed, according to Mr. Koavitz, because "the overwhelming
majority of the people had changed their position." (p. 261.) Senator Fulbright and
others have compared the Brown case to prohibition, but Mr. Konvitz rejects the
parallel: "The American people in general have not found the experiment with equality unsatisfactory. There is no national movement for the repeal of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (p. 261-62.) This may be true, but it is questionable that either the
contrast or the comparison can be pushed very far. If there are few, except in the
South, who would repeal the Civil War amendments or overrule the Brown case, still
there are not so many who will go to great lengths for full enforcement. It is almost
as if everyone approved of prohibition as long as bootlegging was also tolerated.
It is undeniable that racial discrimination persists only because the American p.ople
as a whole do not sufficiently will its extinction. If they did, there would be wealthy
Negroes living along Park and Fifth Avenues and playing golf at Piping Rock and
tennis at Easthampton; unions would expel southern locals that practice discrimination, and chain stores and hotels would dose their southern branches or admit Negroes;
the Federal Communications Commission would deny radio and television licenses to
southern universities and other segregated institutions, and northern universities and
educational associations would refuse accreditation to segregated schools. If churches,
corporations, athletic associations, and a hundred other social and economic institutions would follow a determined and effective integrationist policy, there would soon
be no segregation, and Thurgood Marshall could apply his talents in other fields.
But that is not the temper of the country, and so the Brown case -will have its
sequels, and ten or twenty years from now some will write a book called "A Century
and a Quarter of Civil Rights."
TELrrD TAYLOn *
5. 71 Stat. 634 (1957), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 M1953), 23 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 18iGl
(1958), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 1975a-197Se, 1995 (195S) (Supp. 1, 1959-1l0t).
6. 74 Stat. S6 (1960), iS U.S.C. §§ S37, 1074. 1509, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241, 640, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1974-1974e, 1975d (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
* Member of Taylor, Scoll, Ferencz & Simon; Visiting kcturer, Columbia Univerzity
School of Law and Yale Law School; Member, Bar Association of the City of New York.
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Wallace Mendel-

son. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 151. $4.00.
Every so often an important work comes along which bucks the tide of conventional
academic opinion and sacrifices popular idols and idolatries. Such a work was Mayers'
Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment?' and such a work is Mendelson's Justices
Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court. Neither Mr. Justice Black nor Mr.
2
Justice Frankfurter are figures to whom legal scholars and political scientists have
is
both
reaction
a neutral reaction. Add the views of Professor Mendelson, whose
sharp and profound and the result is a powerful work. As might be expected from
covered in the recent exchanges on
the title, it necessarily tills some of the ground
"neutral principles of constitutional law." 3 From the work of Justices Black and
Frankfurter the author derives useful examples for this controversy, particularly on
such mooted matters as consistency and generality in the decision-making and
rationalization process and intellectual honesty. The book is presented with an incisiveness of thought, captivating brevity, and clarity of expression which is all too rare
in current legal discourse.
The fascination which the Court and its Justices have held for American scholars
goes back to the dawn of our Nation and has generated some of our enduring literature on the theory and practice of American government. Certainly a part of this
fascination, perhaps the major part, is grounded on a continuing uncertainty over the
"true" or "proper" role of the Court in the operation of American government and
the structure of public law and policy. Marbury v. Madison,4 gave a partial answer
but afterthoughts continue. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that the institution
of judicial review represents a marriage of two opposing traditions of the colonists.
One is democracy, in the 17th and 18th century sense of middle class autocracy, The
other is monarchy. People do not really want full and ultimate responsibility for
their destiny, nor for the natural consequences of their desires and acts, nor for the
delicate business of communal preservation and evolution. The Supreme Court therefore, like the President, is looked to as a kindly king, benevolent despot, "great white
father," or spiritual counselor. With this child-like adoration there goes child-like
wilfulness. We are disturbed when the Court acts contrary to our wishes in policy
matters; but we would feel frightened and abandoned if it entirely abdicated its
policy role. The last thing that even the Court's severest critics want is to abolish
judicial review; at most they want to blunt the horn that gores their ox.
Mendelson's focus is on Justices Black and Frankfurter, seen as representing,
1. Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? (1959).
The author and this reviewer have the dubious distinction of being both. A frequent
contributor to legal journals, Professor Mendelson is a professor of political science at the
University of Texas.
3. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev, 1
(1959); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959); Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959); Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298
(1960) ; Griswold, Foreword, Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 81 (1960); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661 (1960). Mendelson makes no reference to these works,
the principal reason being that it is obvious that his basic research and writing was done
by early 1959, despite the publication date of 1961.
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2.
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loosely, the opposite poles of Platonic idealism and Aristotelian pragmatism. But
because the time span, covered by the book, is the last three decades, and perspective
requires some allusion to earlier periods, the book is also a quite respectable treatise
on constitutional law per se.
The position of Mr. Justice Black on civil liberties is well-movm, and has been
characterized as absolutistic in the first amendment area. If a case is presented as
having-or as in Ter;niniclo0 has implicit in it-a conflict between freedom of ex-

pression and the regulatory power of the state, Justice Black's vote is foreordained.
Such "result-determinatism" in Justice Black, Mendelson finds, is not confined to the

civil liberties field, but it runs the gamut of public law.

For example, in sixty Federal Employers Liability Act0 cases decided from 193S
through 1958, turning on the sufficiency of the evidence, it does not appear that
Justices Black or Douglas ever held against a workman, save in one case where the

employee on the vimtess stand virtually repudiated his own claim. Through this
approach Justice Black and his like-minded brethren are seen as having converted an

oldstyle negligence statute, with fault as a necessary element of proof, into a modem
compensation statute making the employer an insurer for its employees. Granted
that this may be good policy and in accord with present values-should the courts

"recognize this trend and 'interpret' statutory law accordingly, or should they wait
for legislation?" (p. 23.)
Direct comparison with Mr. Justice Frankfurter is not possible here because of his
well-known dissociation from FELA cases since 1949, but his expressed views are
obviously contrary to those of his colleague. In Fair Labor Standards Act cases

(FLSA), where direct comparison is possible, a sharp conflict in approach is apparent.
Congress, exercising its prerogative of legislative choice, chose not to make the coverage of FLSA coterminous with the full reach of potential national jurisdiction under
the commerce clause. Instead it was made to apply to employees "engaged in [interstate] commerce," or in occupations necessary to production of goods for commerce.
Mr. Justice Black and others from the outset took a broad view of FLSA coverage.

The Court, however, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, finally drew a line. The
10 East 40th St.8 case distinguished between maintenance vorkers in a commerce
producer's separate office building, and maintenance workers in a general office building wherein some space was leased for executive and sales offices of manufacturing
companies. This line obviously was "dialectically vulnerable, as such lines always are,
when judged exclusively by bordering cases." (p. 18.) But some line was essential if
the Court was to respect Congress' compromise, essential to the enactment of the lax.,
between exercising all or none of its commerce power in this field. In terms of raw
numbers, in fifty-nine FLSA cases from 1941 through 1959, Justice Frankfurter upheld workmen's claims in thirty-two and employer claims in twenty-seven. Justice
Black voted consistently pro-labor, except in four cases where the issues were simple
enough to be settled unanimously.
From the standpoint of the debate over judicial neutralism alluded to earlier,9
Mendelson's FELA and FLSA case review is especially interesting, even vhen allowance is made for the fact that these cases involved statutory interpretation rather
than constitutional adjudication. Is Justice Blacks approach to FELA cases illus5.
6.
7.
S.
9.

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
35 Stat. 65 (1903), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1953).
52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1963).
10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
Note 3 supra and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

trative of Professors Miller and Howell's advocacy of "'a Teleological jurisprudence,
one purposive in nature . . .' "Y10 or a "'policy-oriented' law,"' 1 or "systematic participation ... in the travail of society. . ."?12 Also, are Justice Black's expansionist views
on the coverage of FLSA, repudiated four times by Congress by Mendelson's count,
simply part of the price of judicial participation "in the travail of our society," or
are there some "equal justice under law" values also at stake?
The antitrust record is similar. The Court in the decade 1949-1959, decided nineteen business-consumer clashes under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.lB Only Mr. Justice
Black found a law violation in each instance. More instructive perhaps, is the BlackFrankfurter contrast in administrative agency cases. In Justice Frankfurter, Mendelson finds a strong tendency to support administrative decision, based on Frankfurter's
general or "legal," or perhaps "neutral" (?) principle of respect for the administrative process. His votes are comparable for the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the National Labor Relations Board-voting to sustain the NLRB in sixteen out
of twenty-one cases and the ICC in thirteen out of sixteen, in the early period. In
Mr. Justice Black he sees a selective-or "result-determinative"--principle of supporting the "liberal" agency with far greater frequency than the other. The record
showed support for the NLRB in twenty out of twenty-one cases and the ICC in
two out of fifteen. In a later period, from 1953 through 1957, Justice Black supported the ICC in two out of ten cases; the NLRB in only eight out of eighteen.
"If the Justice's [Black's] attitude in the one area remained constant, in the other
it seems to have changed. The Taft-Hartley Act-to say nothing of the Eisenhower
Administration-had intervened." (p. 40.)
In the light of the foregoing, Mendelson very likely would heartily approve the
following comments made by Professor Wechsler in his 1959 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lecture at the Harvard Law School:
I now add that whether you are tolerant, perhaps more tolerant than I, of the
ad hoc in politics, with principle reduced to a manipulative tool, are you not also ready
to agree that something else is called for from the courts? I put it to you that the
main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on
analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved. To be
sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the case they have before them. But
must they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, tested not
only by the instant application but by others that the principles imply? . . . A
principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with
respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neu.
trality transcend any immediate result that is involved. 14
Justice Black's apparent "result-determinative" approach in the quite different field
of diversity of citizenship is illustrated by Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co.op., 15
where the issue was employee status, vel non, under state workmen's compen.
sation law. If there was employee status then the plaintiff-laborer's exclusive remedy
10. Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 661, 684 (1960).
11. Id. at 691.
12. Id. at 692.
13. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
14. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15,
19 (1959).
15. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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was -workmen's compensation, and this attempted common-law suit was barred. In
accord with the Erie-York'6 principle the lower federal courts, following state practice, treated the issue as a question of law and ruled against the plaintiff-laborer. The
Supreme Court majority, including Justice Black, reversed and ordered the employee
status issue determined by a jury. It talked about the seventh amendment, and the
mandate for jury trial of "disputed questions of fact." However, in its true light, the
issue would seem to have been one of statutory construction-the existence of a
statutory employee relation--on an accepted set of facts. Mendelson comments:
In the FELA certiorari cases Mr. Justice Black and others seem to use the wellknown sympathies of the jury to evade the old law of negligence and achieve something like the assurance of workmen's compensation. Here they seem to use the same
device to get around genuine workmen's compensation in favor of the potentially more
remunerative negligence verdict. The common denominator apparently is a humane
concern for the victims of industrial accidents. But the cost of Byrd is a step back
towards Szift v. Tyson .. .(p. 85.)
Further examples could be developed from the Dennis'T case in regard to preferred
position,18 or the Dean Milk case' 0- in regard to the issue of Balkanization versus a
national free market of the type for which Europe is still striving. Enough has been
said to indicate the general drift. Justice Frankfurter is marked by his regard for
all the sticky little facts, his rigorous thought, and his careful and reasonably consistent use of categorization. Add separation of powers and the duty of judicial respect
for legislative determinations, and the result is Justice Frankfurters "judicial re16. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64 (1938) and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
17. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
1S. One of Mendelson's chief irtues is that he covers the waterfront of public la, with
Justices Black and Frankfurter. He avoids myopic preoccupation with a few selected areas
of constitutional law. But this is also a partial defect resulting in giving les room than
might be anticipated to the Bill of Rights and first amendment area with its much mooted
questions of preferred position, and of absolutism versus balancing. This may be the area
where Justice Black's "result-determinism" is most appealing, to avoid the erosion of
plausible exceptions that may come with balancing. Perhaps the short answer is that
Mendelson feels, with Wechsler, that "the 'preferred position' controversy hardly has a
point... [and] is pernicious if it implies that there is any simple, almost mechanistic basis
for determining priorities of values having constitutional dimension, as whe.n there is an
inescapable conflict between claims to free press and a fair trial.' Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1959). Mendeson does
recognize that Justice Black's absolutism breaks down in practice and that Justice Black
does "balance" by a definitional process rather than forthrightly. The Justice only insists
that within its "area" freedom of speech is absolute, hut recognizes that the "scop" of
the area is uncertain. See C. L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the
Bill of Rights, Harper's, Feb. 1961, p. 63.
19. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). The Dean Milk opinions are
especially instructive because only by ignoring one crucial fact could the disznters, including Justice Black, even purport to sustain it as a permissible local health measure. They
avoid the commerce clause by suggesting that Dean could still market in Madison by
bringing their raw milk in and pasteurizing it within five miles of the city. Forgetting for
the moment the complete unfeasibility of this economically, this suggestion ignores entirely
the other Balkanizing provision, i.e., twenty-five mile radius limitation on the source of
raw milk. (pp. 109-11.)
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straint." The reasonable man test enters too, serving constitutional law as well as the
common law. Its use is to balance popular sovereignty and general principles in the
context of the hard facts of the actual case. It is subject to misuse, of course, and
is easily criticized by those who think it is devastating to ask if anyone has ever seen
a reasonable man. "But at its best it does suggest an external standard for the guidance of a hard-pressed court; a standard rooted in what Holmes called the only sound
basis for any legal system-'the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong.'" (p. 48.)
Mr. Justice Black proceeds in quite a different manner:
Plainly, Mr. Justice Black leans one way when "liberal" values are at stake and
another way in the face of "conservative" claims-be the issue one of constitutional
law, statutory interpretation, or evaluation of evidence. . . . His humane sympathy
for the common man, his courage, creative vigor, and perseverance mark him as a
dedicated being in pursuit of utopian ends. But is the bench a proper vehicle to use
in pursuing them? (p. 119.)
Devotees of intellectual honesty, knowing that only with rigorous honesty can there
be effective intellectual communication, would say no. If the facts are dropped out
or are only selectively used as in Dean Milk, and logical categories do not hold firm
but yield to ad hoc policy grounds for decision, has not the Justice effectively destroyed the basis for scholarly discourse on principles of public law? Do we not
have in effect the "Senator on the Bench," whom we must meet on his own terms or
not at all?
We may note in this connection that Justice Brandeis is bestknown for his stress
on the factual setting in which constitutional issues arise. To this tradition Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with Mendelson as his disciple, is heir. The "reasonable man" test
and "balancing" lead straight to detailed factual scrutiny. The absolutistic, almost
formulary system of Justice Black leads in the opposite direction:
Mr. Justice Black understands the power'of the elemental. His characteristic tools
are the great, unquestioned verities. He draws no subtle distinctions. The niceties of
the skilled technician are not for him. His target is the heart, not the mind. His
forte is heroic simplicity. His opinions attain great power because they seldom bother
with mundane considerations that baffle others-e.g., application of the winged principle in a less than ideal world; or the impingement of one vast Platonic truth upon
another.... He insists that we live up to our highest aspirations-and when we fail
to do so he would save us from ourselves. Finally, it will appear, his idealism is
deeply colored (some might say compromised) by sympathy for what the New Deal
called the "forgotten man." In contrast, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is a pragmatist.
His wisdom is the wisdom of experience. His forte is reason, not hallowed bias or
noble sentiment. He has little confidence in the capacity of judges to sit in judgment
upon the community, to erase its errors-if such they be. He counts more on man's
ability to learn than to be taught. In the absence, then, of unusually compelling
circumstances he accepts our compromises with eternity as the essence of the lawand leaves us free to grow with experience; to learn the lessons that come with selfinflicted wounds. (p. 13-14.)
The legends about Justice Holmes include the story that upon departing to assume
his duties on the Supreme Court he was admonished to do justice, and responded
thoughtfully that his job was merely to enforce the law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
follows this Holmesian view in his emphasis on regularity and uniformity as the
essence of the law-along with neutrality as the crux of the judicial function. For
the liberal cynic Holmes' reply is seen as a question-begging response. In part it is, but
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it is more than that. Justices Holmes and Brandeis, as their concurrence in Tk17neyf
amply illustrates, were concerned with justice, but also felt keenly that they v ere
bound to do justice under law, i.e., in accordance with that very special allocation of
function and authority which is the essence of federalism and separation of powers.
This question of the possibility of neutral principles of constitutional law is an
old one. It is easy to insist, because it is partly true, that regardless of what a judge
may profess, he cannot long escape his own sense of justice, i.e., his own bias. Objectivtity is an aspiration, not a quality that exists in nature in its pure form. "Be
that as it may," said the late Judge Learned Hand, "we know that men do differ
widely in this capacity; and the incredulity which seeks to discredit that knowledge is part of the crusade against reason from which we have already so bitterly
suffered. We may deny-and, if we are competent observers, we will deny-that
no one can be aware of the danger [of his bias] and in large measure provide
against it."21
This comes very dose to the heart of Professor Mendelson's "quarrel" with Justice

Black and necessarily proceeds from, and illuminates. his concept of the judicial
function. With Learned Hand, in the tradition of "judicial restraint," Mendeson
groups Taney, Waite, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo. and Frankfurter. "These
are the humilitarians, the pragmatists. Recognizing that judicial legislation is inevitable, they would hold it to a minimum." (p. 115.) In the other tradition, forming a sort
of "big brother dub" (although Mendelson does not use this term), are 'Marshall, Field,
Peckham, Fuller, Sutherland, and Black. "For them judicial legislation is not incidental, it is the heart of the judicial process. They see great visions and feel compelled to embed them in the law. Or, more mildly, their creative impulses are guided
by their ideals.. . . Law, then, is simply a tool to be manipulated in accordance with
the judge's vision of right and wrong." (p. 116.)22
The "activist" tradition is, of course, a way of getting things done, perhaps a good
many good things. Marshall made us a nation, and Mendelson has no quarrel with

Marshall's rendering of the commerce clause, and is glad to see the Court return to
it, after the aberration of 1895-1935. One suspects though that he finds a certain

consistency of ratiocination-a concern to develop a body of legal doctrine and not
just a line of judgments based on a good guy-bad guy dichotomy-in Marshall, which
he finds lacking in Black. And he says: [Almong the activists in our judicial history
20. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
21. Dilliard, The Spirit of Liberty 218 (1959) (Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand);
Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court 57-58 (1961).
22. Compare, in this connection, the following observations:
"If one regarded himself as having a special mission to fulfill, or if he were quite largdy
the prisoner of his absolute convictions, he would not meet the highest standards of
judicial performance. When decisions are too much result-oriented, the law and the public
are not well served." Griswold, Foreword, Of Time and Attitudes-Profeszor Hart and
Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 94 (1960), and: "Hence we suggest that judicial
decisions should be gauged by their results and not by either their coincidence with a szt
of allegedly consistent doctrinal principles or by an impossible reference to neutrality of
principle. The effects, that is to say, of a decision should be weighed and the conequences assessed in terms of their social adequacy. Alternatives of choice are to be considered, not so much in terms of who the litigants are or what the issue is, but rather in
terms of the realization or non-realization of stated societal values. What thosLe values
might be, we do not now set forth." Miller & Howell, The IMyth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661, 690-91 (1960).
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there are more Sutherlands than Marshalls; among those judges whom history has
labeled 'great,' the humble outnumber the others." (p. 124.)
It is refreshing to have someone write thus about the Supreme Court as though it
were a court, and not simply one more policy organ which rises every morning like
Galahad or a Teddy or Franklin Roosevelt with the thought: "What new thing can I
do today which will make the world a better place to live in."
Although Mendelson uses the vague catch phrases-judicial restraint and judicial
activism-in his groupings of the justices, he is at bottom concerned with something
more basic and more definite in his contrast of Black and Frankfurter. It has to do
with Justice Black's "absolutism," and with Justice Frankfurter's everlasting, meticulous concern for the facts, for the pluralistic cast of American society and government,
and the finiteness of human wisdom. In closing let Mendelson, using in part the words
of Justice Frankfurter, speak for himself:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has tried to subsume will to law and, where the law is vague,
judicial will to the will, or conscience of the community. If he falters, is it that his
grasp is short, or that his reach is long? ...Meanwhile, such a judge must carry a
heavier burden than does he . . . whose sense of Justice-is automatically decisive.
"Believing it still important to do so," Mr. Justice Frankfurter has "tried to dispel
the age-old illusion that conflicts to which the energy and ambition and imagination
of the restless human spirit give rise can be subdued . . . by giving the endeavors of
reason we call law a mechanical or automatic or enduring configuration. Law cannot
be confined within any such mold because life cannot be so confined." (p. 129-30.)
RoBERT G. DcoN, JR.*
*

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.

